‘Chindia’ is a newly created term that is being debated in China and India. When Indian politician Jairam Ramesh coined the term a few years ago, the Congress Party was still in opposition. [1] Anyone engaged in China studies for any length of time would perceive the potential for India and China if the two nations could address their existing problems. The term therefore points to a future in which the two Asian giants can produce a new force in the international system. That force would presumably impact on the balance of the system, simply because of the size, population and material capacity of the two nations, especially if they were combined, which is precisely the implication of the term ‘Chindia’. Can these two states combine? If they really address their bilateral problems, will they, as a combined force, challenge the current system?
The international system is often perceived as an organism that aspires to achieve a balance of power among its principal constituents. The post-Cold War period has witnessed a unique power equation, with the United States at the top, leading to a new equilibrium, but one whose stability and longevity have been debated heatedly. By common consent, equilibrium is built on the balance of power between dominant powers or blocs, as was the case during the Cold War. The absolute power of the United States in the international system seems, however, to have created an unseen equilibrium, which could maintain the stability of the system on the one hand, but which does not allow any other potential powers to challenge US dominance on the other. This is what the US global strategy is supposed to be about. In this context, the rise of China and India could present an intolerable challenge to the United States. Let’s look into this issue by examining the debate about the US-dominated equilibrium before discussing China–India ties.
First of all, achieving systemic equilibrium can be supported on moral grounds. Despite the fact that all nation-states in the international system try to maximise their interests—and that this endeavour could readily lead to conflicts—few theories see conflict as a good thing. Systemic equilibrium is supposed to reduce the possibility of conflicts among nations and, therefore, the debate is not about whether equilibrium should be sustained, but what kind of equilibrium. Different nations had different opinions due to their respective interests, which was evident during the Cold War. For instance, the bipolar system was able to maintain basic stability in the international system, thus reflecting general equilibrium. Jawaharlal Nehru, however, the founding father of modern India, found so little to appreciate in this equilibrium that he and other leaders of developing countries who had no interest in joining either bloc looked for a ‘third way’ by establishing the Non-Alignment Movement, which was, by its nature, an attempt—though not necessarily successful—to create a new equilibrium, or to break down the general equilibrium.
When equilibrium is determined by the balance of power between the dominant players, those who do not have power might disagree with the situation, but it does not change the reality. Furthermore, in many cases, they could even benefit from the general equilibrium, because it helps maintain stability. They are thus described as free riders—a phenomenon that is discerned in many geopolitical games. India and China have have experienced this role. During the Cold War, even though India signed a security treaty with the Soviets, it remained neutral in East–West confrontations. In the meantime, the featured stability of the international system saw India acquire a favourable position from which to look for assistance from the two blocs when a crisis in its national security came up. [2] As for China, its late leader Deng Xiaoping was fully aware of the opportunities resulting from systemic stability long before the end of the Cold War. Deng’s case for ‘reform and opening up’ stressed the importance of a stable environment to China’s development and he argued that the Cold War stalemate provided that stability. Deng’s new thinking thus paved the way for the adjustment of China’s foreign policy.
Equilibrium thus presents two features. One is that it is not broken by those who are dissatisfied but who do not have the necessary power, and the other is that it can benefit many members of the international system, including those who are not satisfied with it. This point might contain some important implications when one considers the rise of China and India and their impact on the world system.
While equilibrium might be a universal feature of the international system, the dynamics inherent in the system will nevertheless bring about change, because the power of nations, especially the major players, changes. Therefore, judging from systemic evolution, the prospect that equilibrium could be broken exists, and the main driving force stems from nations’ pursuit of their own interests, rendering moral judgment of the system less relevant. In other words, maintenance of the existing equilibrium and pressures to move to a new equilibrium result from the necessity to defend one’s own interests. The key is whether the players have sufficient power to break the equilibrium and, further, whether this will benefit or hurt the interests of the players who have such power. It is precisely on this point that the rise of China and India could result in important new variables. Insofar as the power of China and India is concerned, they do not have the capabilities to alter the equilibrium, but the dominant power of the current system is not likely to estimate the prospect only by judging what China and India have and do now, but by what they will have and do in the future. This is the basis of the US strategic vision that focuses on prevention. One of the United States’ preventive measures is, for instance, to make countries such as China and India ‘stakeholders’. [3] In the US view, the countries that can challenge the existing system have to be integrated into it, thus preserving the dominance of the United States. From the American viewpoint, the existing power equation is rational, and the United States should do what it can to maintain and preserve equilibrium. It is therefore imperative to study whether the current equilibrium is desirable.
[1] Ramesh’s book on Chindia was published in 2003, and the Congress won the general election in 2004. Ramesh himself joined the cabinet to take the post of State Minister for the Ministry of Commerce.
[2] The 1962 border conflict with China provided such a case, when India received support from the United States and the Soviet Union, further isolating China from the international community. Some Chinese scholars even argue that China’s unilateral cease-fire during the war was partially attributed to this fact, despite China’s military victory.
[3] The term was used by former Undersecretary Zollick to refer to the status of China. In the meantime, India’s position is also changing fast. Since 2002, when the Bush Administration issued its first National Security Strategy, China and India were referred to in all US policy reviews and reports as rising powers that the United States should deal with cautiously, and they were further described as ‘the nations at a strategic crossroads’.