By common consent, equilibrium is realised through a sustainable balance of power. When ideology played a decisive role during the Cold War, East–West confrontation brought about a basic structure in the international system that was, in general, stable. The collapse of the Soviet Union—the so-called ‘end of history’—ended this, with neo-liberalism prevailing. This does not, however, change the fact that equilibrium is necessary for international stability. In China, the debate turned out to be about the possible multi-polarisation of international politics, until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 that saw the birth of neo-conservatism. Also, as a result, ‘the clash of civilisations’ seems to have been revived. The new form of confrontation, however, has only an ideological shell. Trying to make religion the real root of conflict in the post-Cold War ear is difficult, and the real issue is whether a new equilibrium under US dominance is possible. When the United States uses its power to strike its enemies, what it defends are US interests rather than religion and the maintenance of what the United States perceives as the rational equilibrium. Those forces that attack the United States in a non-traditional way do not constitute a real power to change the structure or create a new balance of power in the international system. That is why such confrontation could be described only as asymmetrical conflict. Non-traditional forces do not constitute elements decisive enough to change the fundamental structure of the international system.

The current system is thus characterised by a lack of significant power to parallel that of the United States. Because of this, debate has sprung up about whether the current system represents real equilibrium. By traditional assessment, it would be difficult to define the current system—with one absolute power—as equilibrium. Further, by a similar assessment, a system without equilibrium might not provide stability. The reality, however, seems different from the assessment—that is, the US-dominated system does not show much instability. Instead, because of its huge capability, the United States tries to build up a global framework with bilateral arrangements as its pillars. Needless to say, the United States takes the lead in such a system. The US approach has been well practised in the Asia-Pacific region and has won support particularly, of course, from its allies. The approach is now extending itself to South and Central Asia. As US President, George W. Bush, said during his visit to South Asia in March 2006, the United States wanted to help India rise to the status of a global power. President Bush did not say what kind of global power the United States wanted India to be, but it was certainly not one on par with the United States or one that enjoyed regional hegemony. The United States is unlikely to prefer to share its dominant position in the international system with any other power. Whether the US approach is successful, at least from the US perspective, the current system presents a favourable equilibrium, and the United States does not want to see any other real or potential power bloc to balance against it.

The issue here is whether other big powers such as China and India will accept such a US-dominated equilibrium. The answer lies in how they evaluate their own position and role in the international system and, more importantly, the judgment of their own interests.