The existing international system is characterised by the sole superpower’s dominance, presenting a unique equilibrium. It is unique because it differs from any other kind of equilibrium in history; however, it still has the general characteristic of maintaining basic stability. Historical experience since the birth of the nation-state suggests that the rise of other powers is likely to break such equilibrium and return the system to normal equilibrium. This development could be the default scenario for the impact of Chindia’s rise on the international system, but it might not be something the current dominant power would like to see. Whatever its prospects, the United States is likely to do what it can to prevent it or delay its progress. The dominant power’s logic lies in a vision that any attempt to restore the international system to ‘normal’ equilibrium will constitute a challenge to the United States, that normal equilibrium will hurt American interests, and therefore the United States should seek to prevent it from taking place. The two logics seem to be in conflict: first, the rise of Chindia will shatter the equilibrium of the international system; and second, the return to normal equilibrium will hurt the interests of the dominant power. This chapter tries to argue that the rise of Chindia might not destroy equilibrium. On the contrary, China and India will try their best to maintain equilibrium, thus promoting stability in the system—not because maintaining equilibrium is politically or morally correct, but because it fits their interests. In the process of resuming normal equilibrium in the international system, the rise of Chindia will not necessarily hurt US interests, and it could even promote American leadership in the world system in the years ahead.

That the rise of Chindia does not put at risk the equilibrium of the international system is based on three arguments. First, the equilibrium of current system is abnormal. It is a sort of absolute pyramid equilibrium with American power far superior to that of any other country or bloc. In historical terms, it is a temporary phenomenon, created by specific conditions, but this does not mean that the world can be expressed only in this way. In the meantime, the US-dominated system nevertheless maintains general stability, which in turn provides crucial conditions for China and India to pursue their own development. As Chinese leaders have reiterated, peace and development are the critical features of today’s world. That definition is consistent with the equilibrium of the US-dominated system. Given this context, as long as other countries do not deliberately challenge the US-dominated system, with the rise of other nations that are qualified with fundamental conditions as big powers, the international system will shift from abnormal to normal equilibrium. If the rise of China and India does reach such a level as to contribute to a new power equation, it will only return the international system to its most familiar format, in which the big powers will present a new power structure, leading to a relative pyramid equilibrium. More importantly, economic globalisation has increased the pace of integration between nations, and interdependence between big powers is dramatically increasing. It is thus safe to predict that challenging systemic equilibrium will become an increasingly difficult option for China or India, and maintaining it will much better serve their interests.

Second, the rise of Chindia will be a gradual process. No-one really knows how long it will take for the two countries to reach such a level as to constitute a change in the equilibrium of the international system. Today, it is generally agreed that a nation’s capacity is decided by comprehensive national power, not by GDP alone. At this point, China and India have a long way to go before becoming genuine global powers. In that long process, both have similar incentives and face similar constraints. Just as they cannot become successful overnight, there is nothing that can stop their development completely. In the meantime, the systemic force of the international regime will integrate them into the system gradually, and dampen any instincts to favour a different system. China’s insistence on joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and India’s painful efforts to achieve recognition from the international community as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state constitute cases in point. Whether or not they become global powers, their interests will drive them to integrate with the international system politically and economically, becoming stakeholders rather than challengers. The deeper they are integrated, the higher will be the stakes, and the stronger will be their interests in maintaining systemic stability rather than risking change to the system.

Third, the rise of Chindia is constrained not only by the dominant power in the current system, but by bilateral elements. While Sino–Indian relations have improved in the past couple of years, they are far from presenting a common force in the international system. At the conceptual and policy levels, there is still much inconsistency and divergence between the two countries. Moreover, it can be safely predicted that this will endure, and could even expand as a result of the disparity in interests and status. The higher the inconsistencies, the weaker the phenomenon of Chindia will remain and the smaller will be its impact on the prevailing international system. That will not be a destructive element as far as systemic stability is concerned, though it will be negative from the standpoint of their bilateral relationship.

In conclusion, the simultaneous rise of the two developing powers, which have various differences and difficulties, is an unprecedented phenomenon for the international system. Both powers share the ambition for and expectation of securing proper status in the system. Judged by their behaviour and policy, it could be said that both are expecting to be accepted as a global power in the US-dominated system. Their rapid growth is providing an increasingly solid basis for this expectation. In the meantime, their development is based on stability of the system, and they are thus the beneficiaries and keepers of systemic stability, which means that they will not challenge US dominance, because such a challenge will be destructive to stability. At this point, one could argue that China and India have already passed the crossroads, and are now in the process of integrating themselves into the international system by peaceful means through their development momentum. Their growth favours equilibrium of the international system and the role of the dominant power, as is demonstrated in their increasingly mature relationship with the United States in economic and trade exchanges, political interactions, security dialogues and so on. ^[10] The trends and prospects in this regard are quite positive, which will also help promote China–India relations. In final analysis, the rise of Chindia is not and cannot be a zero-sum game either to the international system or to Sino–Indian relations.