The commonality of China and India could help explain their impact on the world system, but it should not lead to a conclusion that they will retain their similarities and remain consistent within the international system. Negative elements in bilateral relations do play a role, and how to reduce them is a challenge.

First of all, concepts make the difference. In China–India relations, concepts such as ‘hostile enemy’ or ‘good neighbour’, competitor or collaborator and rival or partner are not clearly defined. In the past half-century, these concepts have come up, depending on specific situations. After the border conflict, for example, the concept of the other as the enemy prevailed for a long time, and, during and even after the Cold War, the concept of rivalry was applied despite the genuine progress of rapprochement. At a press conference in March 2004, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao argued that, in more than 2000 years of exchanges between China and India, 99.9 per cent had been friendly, with conflict and tension prevailing for only a very short time. He thus strongly suggested a forward-looking vision for both sides. ^[7] Here, the Premier might have been referring to the importance of changing perceptions of each other. While the unpleasant episode was short indeed, ^[8] it might not be easily forgotten, because it took place not very long ago. More importantly, the unpleasant episode stemmed from geopolitical ideas, and they might not disappear with the rise of Chindia. It is therefore crucial for both sides to change their visions and perceptions and not allow notions of geopolitical rivalry to prevail.

Second, the disparity of China’s and India’s positions in the international system due to material capacity and the pace of growth could create new problems. For instance, in 2005, when efforts by the G4 (Germany, Japan, India and Brazil) to reform the UN Security Council failed, Indian media and academia alike presented lots of views, some of which attributed the failure to China’s opposition and accused China of being unwilling to see India’s rise as a global power. China was thus put into the category of a status-quo power rather than a rising power like India. This is not true, however, the key does not lie in how biased Indian media might have been or in the historical legacy. It is the disparity of their respective status in the international system that leads to different perceptions of interests when a crucial issue comes up. The same was true when India responded coldly to China’s request for a seat in SAARC in the first Sino–Indian strategic dialogue in January 2005 in Delhi, though India finally accepted China as an observer at the SAARC Dhaka Summit in November the same year. That incident shows that India might not be comfortable sharing a forum in which it leads with a neighbour more powerful than itself. One could argue that the disparity between the two developing powers could lead to suspicion that the weaker party would regard the stronger party as a source of pressure or even an obstacle.

Third, in the political arena, there is another kind of disparity that favours India: the Western-dominated system apparently accepts democratic India more easily than it does China. For instance, in the US strategic blueprint, although China and India are identified as ‘the big powers at a strategic crossroads’, the American assessment of India tends to stress the positive. As President Bush said before and during his state visit to India in March 2006, the United States appreciated India’s multicultural character and democracy and saw India as a strategic partner. The United States wanted to help India become a global power, though the President did not say what kind of global power the United States wanted India to be. With that appreciation, the United States decided to exempt India from the principles that guided its nuclear non-proliferation policy. ^[9] Compared with China, India apparently has a more favourable status. This political disparity might make India believe that it enjoys some sort of superiority, and to judge China as Western countries do. That would reduce the commonality of the two as developing countries in the international system, the impact of which would be negative as far as the rise of Chindia is concerned.

To sum up, the rise of China and India contains both positive and negative elements. For the purposes of this chapter, the issue is how the trajectory of these two states might affect the equilibrium of the international system.