It should be clear in the first place that the simultaneous rise of China and India does not mean that they are in similar stages of development, or possess similar material capabilities. Compared with other developing countries, the rapid development of China and India—as states with large territories and populations—could impose significant change on the international system. The disparity between them is therefore less important than the prospect that their growth could have implications for the equilibrium of the international system. The rise of China and India is therefore discussed as the collective, Chindia, because China’s development has already attracted extensive attention and India’s rise, although starting later, has also shown strong momentum. More importantly, for more than half a century after World War II, China and India languished in very weak positions in the international system before finally rising up to the stage at which they could be defined as developing powers. Facing the Western-dominated system, they are in quite similar positions and are therefore likely to exert similar pressures on the system as they develop.

Bilaterally speaking, there is a historical legacy of severe and unresolved problems, but this does not render China and India hostile in the context of the international system. After their border conflict in 1962, the two countries had a painful period dealing with each other, but neither side was disposed to expand the dispute beyond the bilateral context. For instance, India never changed its position in support of China reclaiming its seat in the United Nations, nor did India regard China as an enemy in the international system because of the border conflict alone. By the same token, China was never hostile to the Non-Alignment Movement, which was founded by India with other nations. On the contrary, China fully supported developing countries including India and their great attempt to look for the ‘third way’. In other words, although the 1962 war cast a heavy shadow on the bilateral relationship and changed the perceptions of the two peoples towards each other, it did not shift their position in the international system. Their status as developing countries decided their policies and behaviour within the system.

Now that China and India have acquired great momentum and are recognised as rising powers, this historical lesson is significant in policy making. One could argue that, even if they are not able to solve the boundary issue in the years ahead, this is unlikely to impose a significantly negative impact on their respective behaviour towards each other within the international system. This is precisely what has been observed in their policy regarding the other side, including India’s participation in East Asian regional integration and China’s engagement as an observer in the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Despite the lingering suspicions stemming from their historical legacy, neither side has shifted its support in regional and global affairs. That could be seen as a result of the systemic constraints imposed on their behaviour, but such constraints are positive insofar as the rise of Chindia is concerned, because they will promote their cooperation as strategic partners.

In addition, the features of the current international system provide China and India with even more common ground. The supremacy of the United States has led to a significant imbalance of power in the system, and thus to incipient disequilibrium. To correct it requires a new formation of the power equation to incorporate other comprehensive powers. The rise of Chindia attracts attention precisely because it presents some uncertainties. No-one knows in what form China and India will become world-class nations, or even whether they will achieve this status. The potential their development has shown, however, and the status they have acquired in the international system indicate the possibility that they could change the fundamental structure of the system. Because of that uncertainty, the United States has listed them as rising powers at a strategic crossroads. After 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration stressed the importance of China and India in US global strategy, noting that the United States had to take them into account in its strategic thinking. American awareness of the potential challenges associated with the rise of Chindia is beyond doubt, even though, from the American perspective, their strategic significance can be differentiated, with India as a strategic, democratic partner.