Russia’s enduring identity as a Eurasian power is its strength as well as its burden. Such a dichotomy could cast limits on its relations—as friend or foe—with the West and the East. After nearly 60 years of relations with the former Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, Chinese analysts seem to understand this well (Hongfeng 2008; Haiyun 2008).

Within the realm of feasibility, however, China has lost no time in stretching Medvedev’s Orientalist temptation. Indeed, Medvedev, the new and young Russian President, is perhaps quite unusual in that he became popular in China long before his Beijing summit in May 2008, thanks to his co-chairmanship of China’s ‘Russia Year’ (2006) and Russia’s ‘China Year’ (2007). The Russian President is described as China’s ‘old friend’, despite his (relatively) young age and youthful appearance. As part of the China Year activities, Medvedev, then Vice-Prime Minister, even spent an hour and a half with Chinese ‘netizens’ (Internet surfers) from Moscow in February 2007. No top Chinese leader has ever done that with either Chinese or Russians. In the eyes of many Chinese, the young Russian President is indeed quite different from his predecessor in his familiarity and comfort with Chinese culture. Many times, including during his talk at Beijing University, Medvedev demonstrated his knowledge and appreciation of Chinese culture and philosophy (‘Medvedev meets Chinese students, says he loves Chinese philosophy, culture’, Itar-Tass, 24 May 2008). Putin, in comparison, is more interested in Chinese kung-fu (‘“I’ve seen genuine Shaolin Kong Fu,” Putin’, People’s Daily [Online], 24 March 2006).

Partly because of the two ‘national years’, mutual understanding between ordinary Chinese and Russians has improved. A national survey by the Russian Public Opinion Study Center in April 2008, a month before China’s earthquake, showed that ordinary Russians believed that China was the country with which Russia had the best relations. ^[8] Separately, a poll in several major Chinese cities conducted by the Chinese Public Opinion Study Institute in Beijing for the same period indicated that more than 80 per cent of Chinese believed relations between Russia and China were very good (‘Over 80 percent of Chinese believe relations with Russia very good’, Itar-Tass, 16 May 2008).

These more positive mutual perceptions are occurring at a time when Russia and China are faced with several major bottlenecks in their bilateral relations. Under President Putin, frequent high-level interactions did not lead to tangible economic gains. In 1994, former President Yeltsin tossed around the idea of building an oil pipeline to China. To date, the world’s emerging manufacturing giant (China) and its energy superpower neighbour (Russia) are still talking. Meanwhile, Russia is perhaps one of the few developed nations that benefits from current high energy prices. Ironically, Russia’s declining manufacturing capability and reluctance to become China’s ‘raw material supplier’ have led, at least partially, to its first trade deficit with China ($8 billion in 2007) since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Even the once thriving Russian military sales to China have come to a standstill. Perhaps the time has passed for China to purchase from Russia large quantities of air and naval armaments based largely on Soviet research and development—unless Moscow is willing to elevate China to the level of India in military sales and technology transfer (Haiyun 2008). Without large-scale military sales to China, the ‘trade structural problem’—meaning Russia as a raw material supplier to China—might not be easily resolved given the growing structural difference between China’s manufacturing capability and Russia’s raw material-based recovery.

These issues or bottlenecks, among others, are far from desirable for Russia and China, though none of them has spilled over to other issues or become politicised thanks to the thickening of the web of connections and institutionalisation of various governmental contacts. Their existence and deepening, however, are not in the interests of Russia or China. Working on these issues with China requires patience, perceptiveness and pragmatism. Medvedev’s presidency seems to provide an opportunity for that.