In the early morning of 8 August 2008, when Medvedev was on vacation (Stanovaya 2008) ^[9] and Putin was in Beijing to attend the twenty-ninth Olympic Games, Georgia launched a military offensive to surround and capture Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The Georgian assault started with a preparatory artillery attack from Georgian positions with fire support, including from notoriously imprecise truck-mounted multiple-barrelled rocket launchers (the LAR-160 rocket system, which fires 160mm unguided rockets). In the 14 hours before Russia’s intervention, 1700 people were killed, including 12 Russian peace-keepers, and many parts of the region were devastated, according to Russia’s account (Wang 2008). Prime Minister Putin blamed Washington for Georgia’s war: ‘If what I presume turns out [to be] true, then there is a suspicion that there are forces in Washington that deliberately fueled the tensions in order to create an advantage to one of the presidential challengers’ (‘Allies let him down—Moscow’, Kommersant.com, 29 August 2008). After Georgian forces entered South Ossetia and initially seized the capital, Tskhinvali, in an attempt to subdue the separatist region, Russian forces responded—belatedly and awkwardly—with an overwhelming show of force. Although Russia eventually established air superiority, it did not achieve this until some unexpected losses of its ground-support jet-bombers and a Tu-22M3 strategic bomber, which should not even have been used in such limited warfare. ^[10] In five days, the war was over and Russian forces were in control, first of South Ossetia and then Abkhazia, plus the Georgian port city of Poti (Giragosian 2008; Stepanov 2008). On 12 August, President Medvedev and French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, reached a six-point plan for a cease-fire. This was followed by a visit by US Vice-President, Richard Cheney, to Tbilisi on 2–3 September and US$1 billion in economic assistance to Georgia (‘Cheney attacks “illegitimate” Russian invasion on visit to Georgia, US vice-president holds talks with Georgian president, raising “grave doubts” about Russia’s reliability as international partner’, The Guardian, 4 September 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/04/ georgia.russia>). A Russian–American confrontation loomed large on the horizon in the Caucasus.

Putin, who was in Beijing for the Olympics opening ceremony, immediately informed the Chinese side of the situation in his meeting with Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, on 8 August (‘Russian PM Putin informs Chinese counterpart of situation in South Ossetia’, Vesti TV, 8 August 2008). China’s reaction to Georgia’s assault, according to Putin, was that ‘nobody needs the war’, which was also US President Bush’s reaction (‘Russia: Putin says China, US against war in South Ossetia “unleashed by Georgia”’, Itar-Tass, 8 August 2008). Meanwhile, China expressed serious concern about the escalated tensions and armed conflict in South Ossetia, and urged all sides to exercise restraint, institute an immediate cease-fire and resolve their dispute peacefully through dialogue (‘Foreign Ministry spokesman: China urges various parties in the South Ossetia conflict to cease fire immediately’, Xinhua, 9 August 2008). Beijing did not publicly and explicitly support Moscow.

A Chinese source pointed to a dilemma in that ‘Russia and Georgia are countries with which China maintains diplomatic relations and friendly ties, hence it should hold a very cautious stance so as not to damage these relations’ (‘Chinese leader calls for ceasefire in South Ossetia’, Interfax, 11 August 2008). What the sources did not say was that Washington, too, was part of this list of ‘friendly’ nations with whom China did not want to jeopardise relations. Strategic ambiguity, if not neutrality, is perhaps the only rational stance for Beijing. Moreover, Washington had been Tbilisi’s strongest supporter. A more cautious approach to the still evolving situation was therefore entirely understandable.

There were some exceptions to China’s carefully balanced posture of evenhandedness. One was China’s decision to send $1 million in humanitarian aid to South Ossetia, for which the Russians publicly expressed appreciation (‘China to send humanitarian aid to South Ossetia’, Itar-Tass, 22 August 2008). Meanwhile, China’s official ambiguity contrasted sharply with the critical views of Georgia and the United States in China’s Internet chat rooms, including those run by official media outlets (‘PRC netizens criticize US over Georgia’s action in South Ossetia’, China–OSC Summary, 15 August 2008, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service).

Six days after the Russian troops halted their military offensive on 12 August, the Russian Security Council Secretary, Nikolai Patrushev, arrived in Beijing for a ‘working visit’. The situation in the Caucasus was discussed in his one-hour, closed-door meeting with his Chinese counterpart, State Councilor Dai Bingguo. Very little about this meeting has been disclosed to date (‘Russian official meets Chinese state councilor, hails high-level Olympics’, Interfax, 18 August 2008; <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/18/content_9490099.htm>). Two days after the end of the Beijing Olympics and two days before the SCO’s annual summit in Tajikistan, President Medvedev declared that Moscow recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Beijing’s immediate reaction came in a news release by the official Xinhua News Agency, citing the negative reactions from various Western countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Germany). Towards the end of the story, this Xinhua news ‘round-up’ noted that ‘the two regions broke from central Georgian rule during wars in the early 1990s after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, but their self-proclaimed independence is not recognized internationally’ (‘Some Western nations slam Russia’s recognition of Georgian breakaway regions’, Xinhua Roundup, 26 August 2008).

China did not immediately react to Moscow’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with good reason: President Hu and President Medvedev were to meet the next day in Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, before the opening of the SCO’s eighth annual summit. During the meeting, Medvedev briefed Hu on the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and on Russia’s stance. Hu said in this meeting that the Chinese side had noted the latest changes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and hoped that the relevant parties would resolve the problems appropriately through dialogue and consultation. A Chinese media report noted that Hu had also told Medvedev:

It is unclear exactly how the two sides ‘explored’ the ‘operation of the China–Russia strategic security consultation mechanism’. The Patrushev–Dai talks on 18 August 2008 in Beijing did look like a ‘strategic security consultation’, but the Chinese media never referred to the meeting as ‘the third round of consultations’. What was clear from the Hu–Medvedev meeting in Dushanbe was the lack of unambiguous Chinese public support for Moscow’s policies towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

According to Chinese sources, the Russian Foreign Ministry presented a revised proposal for the Dushanbe Declaration, requesting that a statement be included on joint action on security and conflict-prevention issues, but China did not agree to the proposal (‘HK commentator lauds PRC handling of SCO “embarrassment” over Georgia conflict, Chang Ching-wei: artfully defusing embarrassment of SCO summit meeting’, Ta Kung Pao [Online], 11 September 2008). Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang reiterated China’s official position on 28 August that ‘China assumes a principled position on analogous issues: all problems need to be resolved through dialogue and consultations’ (‘China confirms difference with Russia on Abkhazia, S. Ossetia independence updated version, amending tagging and precedence’, Interfax, 28 August 2008). As a result, the Dushanbe Declaration essentially adopted a similar posture of ‘neutrality’ as its third clause states:

The member states of the SCO express their deep concern in connection with the recent tension around the issue of South Ossetia, and call on the relevant parties to resolve existing problems in a peaceful way through dialogue, to make efforts for reconciliation and facilitation of negotiations.

The same document reiterates:

In the 21st century interdependence of states has grown sharply, security and development are becoming inseparable. None of the modern international problems can be settled by force, the role of force [as a] factor in global and regional politics is diminishing objectively. Reliance on a solution based solely on the use of force faces no prospects, it hinders comprehensive settlement of local conflicts; effective resolution of existing problems can be possible only with due regard for the interests of all parties, through their involvement in a process of negotiations, not through isolation. Attempts to strengthen one’s own security to the prejudice of [the] security of others do not assist the maintenance of global security and stability.

The participants of the Dushanbe meeting underline the need to respect historical and cultural traditions of every state and every people and the efforts aimed to preserve in accordance to international law unity and territorial integrity of states as well as to encourage good-neighbourly relations among peoples and their common development.

Aside from these familiar principles, the Dushanbe Declaration does contain a somewhat more comforting statement for Russia regarding the Georgian conflict: ‘The member states of the SCO welcome the approval on 12 August 2008 in Moscow of the six principles of settling the conflict in South Ossetia, and support the active role of Russia in promoting peace and cooperation in the region’ (Dushanbe Declaration of Heads of SCO Member States, 28 August 2008, <http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=2360&LanguageID=2>).