Chapter 3. China–Japan relations at a new juncture

Zhang Tuosheng

Table of Contents

I
II
III
IV
Reference

China–Japan relations now stand at a new juncture after more than a decade of turbulence and nearly two years of recovery since the end of the Cold War. Whether China and Japan—two major powers in East Asia—will be able to establish a comprehensive strategic relationship of mutual benefit and realise long-term friendship and cooperation in the new conditions will affect not only the destinies of the two countries but the future of the region and the world at large.

I

China and Japan resumed diplomatic relations in 1972. Remarkable progress was made in the next two decades. Despite some friction from time to time, friendship and cooperation were the mainstream of bilateral relations.

Due to profound changes in the international situation and in the domestic circumstances in the two countries, China–Japan relations entered a long period of turbulence after the mid 1990s. During this period, differences and frictions increased and intensified. After 2004 in particular, disputes between China and Japan broke out on a host of issues, including history, Taiwan, territorial and maritime rights and interests, energy, the growth of Japanese military power, the US–Japan military alliance, Chinese military development, the entry into Japanese waters of a Chinese submarine and Japan’s pursuit of permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Strategic misgivings [1] became more apparent. With the complete interruption of high-level exchanges at the end of 2005, [2] China–Japan relations reached their nadir since the establishment of diplomatic ties. [3]

There are many factors behind the sustained deterioration in bilateral relations. The most serious frictions occur on the questions of history, Taiwan and territorial and maritime rights and interests. When diplomatic relations were established, however, these problems had existed for a fairly long time and had not prevented the two sides from forging diplomatic ties nor had they obstructed growth of bilateral relations. Why, then, did they stand out in the late 1990s?

In the author’s opinion, the reason lies in profound changes in domestic and international circumstances, including: the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and changes in US policy towards China; the rising comprehensive national strength of China and long-term recession and stagnation of the Japanese economy; the withdrawal of old-generation leaders from centre stage in both countries and Japan’s entry into a period of national transformation; [4] China and Japan becoming the two big powers in East Asia [5] and rising nationalism in both countries; the expansion of pro-independence forces in Taiwan and the rise of the Taiwan question; and the impact of the modern media.

The most significant factors are the end of the Cold War and the need to recalibrate the relationship not only in the absence of a common threat (the Soviet Union) but in circumstances in which, for the first time in history, China and Japan are major powers. Neither country was adequately prepared for these major changes and their deep influences, and both lacked effective ways to resolve their differences in this new situation. As a result, the friendly atmosphere between the two countries deteriorated, frictions increased and strategic misgivings deepened. The bilateral relationship developed from one dominated by friendly cooperation with occasional friction or competition in the early 1990s, to the coexistence of cooperation and competition and then to a situation in the new century in which friction and competition exceeded cooperation—as represented by the comprehensive deterioration of bilateral political and security relations.

The deterioration of China–Japan relations not only harmed the strategic interests of the two countries, it had an adverse effect on the stability and development of East Asia, thereby causing serious concern in other countries, including the United States.




[1] China worries about Japan ‘reviving militarism’ or ‘pursuing a path to military power’. Japan, on the other hand, worries about the ‘China threat’.

[2] In 2002, after Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine again, in disregard of strong Chinese opposition, national leaders of the two countries stopped visiting each other but maintained meetings on international occasions. After Koizumi’s fifth visit to the shrine in October 2005, even bilateral meetings on international occasions were interrupted.

[3] China–Japan relations experienced a down turn in 1995–96. At the time, however, frictions did not appear all at once, nor did bilateral disputes intensify to such an extent.

[4] The transformation was made manifest as follows: the old system of conservative and progressive forces, each holding one-half of the power, disintegrated, with conservatism becoming dominant in politics and society and new state-ism on the rise; major adjustments were made to domestic and foreign policies in pursuit of shaking off the shadow of a defeated state and acquiring the status of a political or even military power commensurate with an economic power as a ‘normal state’.

[5] In this situation, neither side wishes to see the rise of the other’s influence in East Asia and both worry about competition from the other. Japan is particularly worried about China’s rise. In reality, the rejuvenation of China cannot be stopped and it is also natural for Japan to develop from an economic power to a political power, although its development potential cannot be compared with that of China given its geographic, population and resource restrictions.