Looking into the future, the general trend for the long-term development of China–Japan relations has been set. The path ahead will sometimes be tortuous but, on the whole, the outlook appears relatively bright. This judgment is based on the following considerations.

First, after years of intense friction, China–Japan relations have moved out of the long period in which both countries failed to adapt to post-Cold War circumstances ^[23] and into a new stage of development. Both sides have drawn on the lessons of the past decade or more and reached an important conclusion that long-term peace, friendship and cooperation are the only choices for them. A logical extension of this is reflected in the joint declarations that China and Japan are ‘cooperation partners rather than [a] threat to each other’, ^[24] that they ‘support each other’s peaceful development’ and that they will ‘work together for the creation of a world of lasting peace and common prosperity’. ^[25] Strengthened bilateral, regional and global cooperation between China and Japan will forcefully contain their differences and link their interests more closely.

Second, the three major differences between China and Japan have been brought under relatively good control and frictions are decreasing. Although their differences on the question of history are unlikely to disappear soon, they are far less likely to become dominant factors again in bilateral relations since China is determined to adopt a pragmatic and forward-looking attitude and the domestic and external environments of Japan have changed. The two countries still differ on the question of Taiwan; however, since Japan will not easily change its one-China principle and the policy of not supporting Taiwanese independence, and with the clear relaxation of the situation across the Taiwan Strait since the spring of 2008, the likelihood of serious friction between China and Japan over this issue has been greatly reduced. On the question of territorial and maritime disputes in the East China Sea, China and Japan have reached agreement to ‘make the East China Sea a sea of peace, stability and cooperation’ and have made initial progress on the steps towards joint development. Although there is still a gap between the desire for joint development and real accomplishments, the shadow of a military conflict has disappeared.

Third, apart from highly mutually complementary economic cooperation and trade, non-traditional security issues including finance, energy, the environment, climate change, infectious diseases and terrorism are rapidly expanding areas of cooperation. The two sides clearly have more common interests than differences in the non-traditional security arena. In the future, strengthened cooperation in these areas will become fuel for the two sides to consolidate and develop their relations.

Fourth, the developments and improvements in the past two years have laid an important foundation for major progress in China–Japan relations. Apart from the abovementioned achievements, sound momentum has been achieved for the resumption and promotion of the various dialogue mechanisms that are conducive to strengthening bilateral, regional and global cooperation between China and Japan. Furthermore, the pragmatic measures taken by both sides to improve their relations and the positive progress made have won extensive support from the two peoples and the world community.

Additionally, the expected stable growth in China–US relations and the rise of ‘neo-conservatism’ and ‘neo-realism’ ^[26] in Japanese political thinking will also benefit sound development of China–Japan relations in the future.

As President Hu pointed out, China–Japan relations now have a solid foundation for growth to a higher level and stand at a new starting point. Against the backdrop of deepening economic globalisation and regional integration, China–Japan relations are all the more strategic and important globally. The two sides must work together and waste no opportunity to push their relations to a new high. ^[27]

We must, however, be sober-minded and acknowledge that there are still multiple difficulties and uncertainties in China–Japan relations and it will not be all smooth sailing. The two sides should be fully prepared for this.

First, although the three major points of sensitivity and friction have been fairly well controlled, they will continue to exist for a long time. On these questions, there is still a large gap between the two sides in terms of perception, policy, desired solutions and expectations. The possibility of any of the above issues regaining prominence cannot be excluded although the likelihood of all three intensifying at the same time is not high. Moreover, differences about the Japan–US military alliance, modernisation of the Chinese military force, Japan’s pursuit of permanent membership of the UN Security Council ^[28] and China’s full market economy status will remain difficult to manage. If handled carelessly, these issues could also have major negative impacts on the future of bilateral relations.

Second, the seriously confrontational popular sentiments that formed during the period of deteriorating relations will take time to change. With bilateral relations warming up, the sentiments of the two peoples towards each other are undergoing positive changes. On the whole, however, these changes lag behind the improvement and development of state-to-state relations and have constituted restraint on bilateral relations. Examples include the radical reaction of Japanese public opinion to the poisoned-dumpling incident, ^[29] the playing up by some Japanese media of the Tibetan incident and incidents during the Olympic torch relay ^[30] and the negative reactions of some Chinese citizens to the initial shipment of earthquake relief materials by Japanese military aircraft and to the agreement on principles guiding joint development of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea. This reflects the fragility that still exists in bilateral relations and indicates that some important differences will still take time to resolve.

Furthermore, considering the above two points plus the two countries’ different social systems and ideology, the deeper strategic misgivings between the two countries will not simply disappear because of the new definition of bilateral relations in formal documents. Such strategic misgivings can be expected to persist and to stand out from time to time among the general public, the strategic research community and government departments in both countries, exerting negative influences on the development of bilateral relations in all fields. It can, however, be said with certainty that if the strategic relationship of mutual benefit continues to progress, mutual political trust will also grow while strategic misgivings will decrease.

Finally, the unstable Japanese political situation is still a fairly big uncertainty. On 1 September 2008, Prime Minister Fukuda, who was in favour of actively developing relations with China, followed the example of his predecessor, Abe, and resigned, ^[31] leading to chaos in the Japanese political situation once again. On 24 September, Taro Aso, who had long been considered a hawk, was elected as the new Prime Minister of Japan. On taking office, Aso was confronted with the various challenges that had defeated his predecessor and had to focus on economic problems and domestic affairs. The anticipated election is unlikely to resolve the underlying sources of instability in Japan’s political situation. ^[32] If the Japanese political situation remains unstable, it could delay the process of China and Japan strengthening their cooperation and resolving differences, or even introduce new variables in Japan’s foreign policy and policy towards China. This is, frankly, quite worrisome.

To sum up, it might appear that the prospects for relative stability in China–Japan relations in the future are quite bright. This does not, however, mean that the relationship will be tranquil. Future China–Japan relations will be rather like China–US relations since the end of 2001. In other words, dialogue and cooperation will accumulate and strengthen; differences will continue to exist or even rise one after another but remain controllable; misunderstandings will gradually decrease and political trust will gradually increase. If China–Japan relations can develop as such, the platform for their cooperation will become broader, mutual sentiments between the two peoples will turn again towards respect and friendship and the most difficult issues between the two countries could gradually be resolved. In the end, the two big countries will be able to find a path to strategic mutual benefit and become friendly partners in cooperation with major influence in a multipolar world.

Such a prospect will benefit China and Japan, East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region and be conducive to world peace, stability and prosperity.