In this fifth hermeneutic cycle, the second researcher developed another text based on the case study document and sought to interpret the text in terms of key stakeholders and the intentions of their communicative actions, and the opinions expressed by the authors. The researcher then included his interpretation of the case study authors’ intentions and opinions.
Table 6.4, “Flexibility factors (extract)”, which we have titled ‘flexibility factors’, provides an extract of the stakeholder intentions, authors’ opinions and researcher interpretations, developed during this cycle.
Table 6.4. Flexibility factors (extract)
|
Ref # |
Intention of communicative action |
Shareholder |
Opinion |
Phenomena |
Reseacher’s interpretation/findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
M1 |
Background |
United Airlines 1992 |
‘integrated system would improve time efficiency, reduce close-out time for hub operations and decrease time-consuming manual baggae sorting and handling.’ |
Objectives |
Operational efficiency is an important objective. However, efficiency alone cannot be driving large projects. |
|
M2 |
Setting expectations |
Author’s hindsight |
‘There were, however, a number of risks inherent in the endeavour; the scale of the large project's size; the enormous complexity of the expanded system; the newness of the technology; the large number of resident entities to be served by the same system; the high degree of technical and project definition uncertainty; and the short time span for completion.’ |
Risks, scale, complexity, newness, granularity |
Projects of huge size and complexity need well-tested methods. Novelty is usually incompatible with scale. |
|
M3 |
Fact Setting expectations |
Author’s hindsight |
‘In August 1994, Mayor Webb approved the construction of a backup system. At the same time, he notified BAE of a $12 000-a-day penalty for not finishing the baggage system by DIA’s original October 29 1993 completion date.’ |
Non-delivery, breakdown of communication, start of hostilities |
Legal means such as penalties are not advisable in situations which require cooperation. Whenever there is still some chance of problem resolution, communication and negotiation should be used instead. |
|
M4 |
Novelisation Setting expectations |
Gene Di Fonso, President of BAE 1994 |
‘He wondered whether he should just cancel the contract and cut his losses, or attempt to negotiate with the City the support required to finish the system as specified, despite the severe deterioration in communication and rising hostility.’ |
Rigidity, lack of communication, hostilities |
Legal means such as penalties are not advisable in situations which require cooperation. Whenever there is still some chance of problem resolution, communication and negotiation should be used instead. |
|
M5 |
Setting expectations Leading Appeal to technical prowess |
Author’s hindsight |
‘Could the problem with the automated system be overcome with the dedication of additional resources? Given that the system represented a significant departure from conventional technology, would reducing its size and complexity facilitate resolution of the problems that plagued it?’ |
Hypothesis: smaller size and complexity, additional resources |
By offering a hypothetical reason for the project collapse early in the teaching case, the authors are likely to lead the reader towards these as a conclusion. |
|
M6 |
Motivation Setting expectations |
Denver 1980s |
‘An aging and saturated Stapleton Airport was increasingly seen as a liability that limited the attractiveness of the region to the many businesses that were flocking to it. Delays had become chronic.’ |
Perceptions and expectations of stakeholders. Strong motivation for the project. |
External pressures could provide positive project motivation. It may however also lead to unduly strong stakeholder expectations, while haste could cause major project problems. |
|
M7 |
Colourising Politics |
Frederico Peňa |
‘The airport was to become a grandiose project to revive the Colorado economy and a master showcase for the Public Works Department.’ |
Perceptions and expectations |
Project overselling can elevate stakeholder expectations beyond common sense. |
The revelations from the fifth cycle show that collaborative hermeneutics can yield substantial benefits. In this case, the two researchers developed independent derivative texts with completely individual approaches to their interpretations. The curious result of this textual analysis has been the revelation that a considerable amount of the original case study seems to be directed at colourising and novelisation of the reported events, at setting the reader’s expectations and, from the very beginning, at leading the reader to reach very specific conclusions at the end of the case – mainly that the project should have been de-escalated before its ultimate failure. While many of these writers’ strategies can be attributed to the intended use of the text in teaching IS students, the selectivity of the text and its clear omissions hint at yet another agenda. In particular, the majority of the case study text seems to rely on an interview with the then President and Project Manager for BAE, Gene Di Fonso. Much of the substance of Di Fonso’s statements seem to be a defence of the BAE involvement in the project and an attempt to lay blame for various aspects of the failure on everyone else. If the authors’ intentions were to direct the reader to sympathise with a wronged BAE then that goal has definitely been achieved.
In the process of ‘peeling off’ the layers of the case study authors’ intentions and prejudices, and by reconciling the two distinct horizons of understanding as developed by both investigators, new observations started to emerge. In particular, we were struck by a large number of issues hinting at the inherent rigidity in the project administration and management.
Fusing the horizons led further to re-evaluating all the findings collected thus far. In particular, in cycles one and two, rigidity and/or flexibility seemed quite irrelevant and nearly all observations could have been explained by assuming the basic laws of project management had been violated. In cycle three, gender parity, work practice conformity, imposition of authority and autonomy reduction were rediscovered, and seen by the researchers as a serious decrease in flexibility.
While some of the inflexibilities could have been attributed to the nature of the project, such as its size, complexity, relative novelty and task granularity, other inflexibility factors, such as inflexible business processes, state and project policies, hiring policies, staff and contractor duties, schedules and expected deliverables, relationships and alliances, finances and contracts, designs, coordination and communication modality, could all only be explicated by the inexperienced and unwilling project management.
The fourth hermeneutic cycle further enhanced the understanding of the case and revealed that while there was initially considerable flexibility in the system as a whole, that flexibility was taken away in the later stages of the project when it was needed most. And that seemed to be inextricably linked to the death of Chief Engineer Slinger.