This cycle examined the decisions identified in the case study document. Along with these decisions, the individuals making the decisions, the decisions themselves, and the outcomes were documented. Table 6.3, “Decisions (extract)” shows what the decision documentation table resulting from this cycle looks like. Surprisingly, the actual number of documented decisions by the case study’s authors numbered only 23.
This hermeneutic cycle revealed quite forcibly that Denver started building the airport before any airline had officially committed to it. United, in fact, committed to the project in December 1992, at the same time as they commissioned BAE to build their own baggage handling system. It would appear that when both Continental and United committed to the project, there was sufficient flexibility available to make major construction changes to airport design.
Table 6.3. Decisions (extract)
|
Dec-11 |
1992 |
DIA decided to seek bids to build an airport-wide baggage system |
DIA PMT |
They contacted 16 companies and of the three who responded, none was considered suitable. |
|
Dec-12 |
1992 |
DIA approaches BAE to bid directly for the airport-wide baggage system |
DIA PMT |
BAE developed a proposal for the most complex and innovative baggage handling system for the entire airport. |
|
Dec-13 |
1992/04 |
BAE awarded contract for the building of an airport-wide baggage handling system |
DIA PMT |
$175.6 m contract signed. BAE required no changes in design, and that they would need unrestricted access to any place in the airport. |
|
Dec-14 |
1992/08 |
United altered plans for a transfer system for bags changing planes |
United Airlines |
System redesign necessitated. |
|
Dec-15 |
1992/09 |
Continental requested that an automated baggage sorter be added. |
Continental |
Implemented at a cost of $4.67 m. |
|
Dec-16 |
1992/09 |
Addition of extra maintenance tracks for servicing of baggage carts |
DIA PMT |
Additional cost of $912 000. |
|
Dec-17 |
1993/02 |
Projected opening of airport delayed from Oct. 1993 to December then later to March 9 1994 |
Mayor Webb |
Panic set in. |
|
Dec-18 |
1993/09 |
BAE loses maintenance contract for baggage handling system |
DIA PMT |
Industrial action by millwrights and electricians over BAE’s proposal for a lower than union endorsed payment. BAE loses maintenance contract. |
|
Dec-19 |
1993/09 |
Projected opening again delayed until May 15 1994 |
Mayor Webb |
|
|
Dec-20 |
1994/04 |
Reporters invited to witness the opening. |
Mayor Webb |
Disaster – everything broke. |
|
Dec-21 |
1994/04 |
Opening delayed indefinitely. |
Mayor Webb |
Delay costs set at $330 000 per month. |
|
Dec-22 |
1994/05 |
LogPlan engaged to review the baggage handling system and airport |
Mayor Webb |
LogPlan report recommended a backup system be implemented. |
|
Dec-23 |
1994/08 |
Backup baggage handling system announced. |
Mayor Webb |
$50 m project. |
This cycle also highlighted the communication gaps between the major stakeholders (DIA, Continental, and United), as well as the assumption made by DIA that each airline was responsible for its own baggage handling system. It is noted that United proceeded to take responsibility for its own system because ‘… They concluded that the schedule had gotten completely out of control from the standpoint of baggage, and they acted to serve their own needs’ (Montealegre et al., 1999, pp. 553-4).
What had been revealed to the researchers by now was that there was a substantial change in the project environment with the death of the Chief Airport Engineer, Slinger, and the succession of Gail Edmond with the attendant loss of autonomy and flexibility and (evidently) project management skills that entailed.