The question now is whether we have lost the rationale for Australia’s force structure? Have we moved away from the defence of Australia and our regional commitments as the primary drivers of the force structure to an expeditionary force primarily designed for operations alongside our US ally in places such as the Middle East? If so, and if we are not careful, this will leave us with something of a hybrid force not optimised for either contingency.

We must not become a one-shot ADF, putting all our eggs into the one basket of protecting two large amphibious ships capable of deploying about 1000 troops each. That must not become the sole operational purpose of the air warfare destroyers or the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighters. In my opinion, leaving the RAN and RAAF with little, if any, independent strategic purpose other than transporting and protecting the Army is a dangerous development and strategically indefensible. In any case, what is the purpose of such an amphibious capability? It seems too modest if it is to mount an opposed landing, and too much if it is only about operating in a permissive environment.

Let me be plain. I have no problem if the primary drivers of the ADF’s force structure remain the defence of Australia and credible regional contingencies. And I note here it is reported that Defence Minister Brendan Nelson’s classified strategic review, considered by Cabinet in August 2006, affirmed that policy. I also support the idea of a somewhat larger Army with more light infantry. But I think we should not be cutting back on such crucial capabilities for the defence of Australia as mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare, to take two important examples. And it is about time we got on with actually implementing network-centric warfare, as distinct from constantly talking about it.^[43] I also think we cannot afford to take our eye off maintaining a clear regional advantage in such high-technology capabilities as strike, air combat, and naval warfare (both surface and subsurface).

Our unique strategic geography will simply not disappear. What I have called the ‘arc of instability’ to our north promises to confront us with even more challenging contingencies than those we have experienced recently in East Timor and Solomon Islands. These are abiding strategic interests for Australia.

However, we need to be careful in the contemporary era about what we expect from the ADF with regard to the threat from terrorism, countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and supporting regional states in difficulty. These are all activities in which Defence has a supporting rather than leading role.

Finally, the financially easy days of defence planning may soon be over for Australia. We face the prospect of a rapidly ageing population, which will create greater demands for healthcare in competition with the defence budget.^[44] When our economy inevitably slows down as an ageing population erodes workforce participation, or our economy simply goes into recession, the pressure will be on to demonstrate that we have a tough-minded and intellectually rigorous force structure plan in place for the ADF. The problem is that this does not seem to be the case at the present time.