Preventing separation and safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity are designated as the primary missions of the PLA. In June 1996, during his visit to Cornell University in the United States, Taiwan’s leader Li Denghui expressed his desire to separate Taiwan from China. In 1999, Li officially put forth the fallacy of ‘two sides, two countries’. In March 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocated Taiwanese independence, won the so-called ‘presidential election’ and became the ruling party. After Chen Shuibian came into power, he broke his promise of ‘four nos and one without’, pursued a radical policy for Taiwanese independence and launched ‘de jure Taiwanese independence’ activities such as constitutional reform, a referendum on joining the United Nations, and so on. The separation of Taiwan thus became China’s gravest and most imminent threat. China’s national defence policy has therefore designated ‘counter-separation’ as the primary mission of the PLA, and construction of the PLA has also been carried out around this mission. The purpose of China’s development of military power is not, however, to attack Taiwan, but to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait because, only backed by powerful military strength can we deter the forces pushing for Taiwanese independence and avoid conflict. As Sun Zi in The Art of War says, ‘To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.’

The second response emphasises the development of the navy, air force and second artillery capabilities. As the PLA originated from the army, the army is the ‘elder brother’ in the military and enjoys great advantages in scale and defence expenditure. With the advent of high-tech and ‘informationised’ warfare, the strategic status of the navy, air force and second artillery force began to rise and China’s national defence policy began to show them more concern. In 1985, 1997 and 2003, China cut the size of the PLA by one million, 500 000 and 200 000 people respectively, with the army suffering the largest cut. The navy, air force and second artillery force suffered smaller cuts and some even had a small increase. Through restructuring, the proportions of the navy, air force and second artillery force in the PLA have been raised by 3.8 per cent, while that of the army has been lowered by 1.5 per cent. The input of defence expenditure for the navy, air force and second artillery force has also been increased.

The third response emphasises winning local wars under conditions of informationisation. With the rapid development of science and technology (information technology in particular) and their extensive application in the military field, the patterns of warfare have begun to change. Although China has always had a basically defensive military strategy, there have been changes of emphasis over time. During the 1980s, China’s military strategy emphasised ‘active defence and luring the enemy in deep’ to win the ‘people’s war’ under modern conditions. The 1990–91 Gulf War demonstrated in an all-round way the power, role and status of high-tech weapons and equipment and also predicted the trend of future warfare. China’s national defence policy therefore shifted its emphasis from military preparation to winning local wars under the conditions of high technology. With the advent of the information era and large quantities of informationised weapons and equipment being used on the battlefield, the patterns of mechanised warfare of the industrial era began to evolve into those of informationised warfare.

The fourth response places stress on international cooperation. China’s reform and open-door policy began in 1978, but its international security cooperation did not unfold until the 1990s. In April 1992, China formally organised its first ‘blue helmet’ troops and sent them to Cambodia to execute tasks. In May 1997, China agreed to join the UN ‘peacekeeping on-call arrangement’. By November 2007, China had sent a total of 9040 people to participate in 18 UN peacekeeping operations and became the largest contributor among the five permanent members of UN Security Council.

In addition, China has significantly expanded its involvement in international cooperation in non-traditional security fields such as counter-terrorism, cracking down on drug production and trafficking, non-proliferation, maritime search and rescue, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian influenza and so on. The 2004 edition of China’s national defence white paper lists carrying ‘out military exchanges and cooperation’ as a formal component of its national defence policy.