China’s strategic culture can be divided into three levels. The highest level is Chinese philosophy. The middle level is China’s national strategic culture. The third level is China’s military strategic culture and foreign strategic culture.
Chinese traditional philosophy is based on the belief that heaven and man should match well, which means that people must follow the objective laws or the thinking of heaven and must not violate them.
Chinese philosophy focuses on the concept of harmony, which means that people should live in harmony with other people, with the natural world and within themselves (by facilitating harmony between the mind and body).
Chinese philosophy has stressed peace despite differences, which means that different people can coexist peacefully even though they have different views.
Confucian philosophy stresses benevolence, which includes several important concepts, such as peace, harmony, propriety, righteousness, morality and love. Confucius said: ‘Harmony is the right way of the world.’ He also said: ‘Harmony is precious.’
Mo Zi advocated universal love, which means people should love others without discrimination.
There are several important features of China’s traditional national strategic culture.
Decision makers should understand military issues, although they must not like war. Because sending troops to fight wars can cause a lot of casualties, they are very dangerous (Zhou 1996:16). Mo Zi even opposed all kind of offensive action.
China should set an example of morality and excellent culture to neighbouring ethnic peoples and nations to attract them to present tribute to the Chinese emperor. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated ‘associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbours’. During ancient times, therefore, China established a regional system of tribute within East Asia.
Chinese civilisation was originally based on agriculture and farming, so one of its major characteristics was avoidance of expeditions of military force. Since ancient times, Chinese people have emphasised defence instead of offence. When the Chinese created the earliest written script, our ancestors used two pictographs to form the character ‘force’ (wu). One pictograph was ‘stop’ (zhi), the other was ‘spear’ (ge). The underlying logic was that wars should be abandoned as an instrument and the use of force could be justified to stop violence. Especially since the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, China has focused on its existing territory instead of on expansion. In the early fifteenth century, even before the period of Western ‘geographic discovery’, a great Chinese explorer and sailor named Zhen He led the largest fleet in the world on seven voyages westward. These voyages, reaching as far as the eastern African coast and the entrance to the Red Sea, took Zhen He to more than 30 countries and regions. Unlike later Western explorers, who conquered the lands they discovered, this fleet did not subdue the newly discovered lands by force. This was not a voyage to plunder the local area for treasure, nor was it one to establish overseas colonies. As decreed by the Chinese Emperor, Zhen He’s task was to convey friendship and goodwill and to promote economic and cultural exchanges between China and other Asian as well as African nations.
Modest rulers can launch a just war against other countries (Zhou 1996:33). Some countries with arrogant rulers should be attacked, especially if they can’t share their wealth with their neighbouring countries (Zhou 1996:33).
Fighting for the reunification of China is justified.
Winning all wars is not the best; defeating the enemy without any war is the best (Zi 1999:35).
The best way to defeat an enemy is to use stratagems; the second-best way is to use diplomacy; the third is to launch a war. The worst way is to attack castles, which should be a last resort, when no other alternatives are available (Zi 1999:35).
Military commanders can use all kinds of stratagems to deceive enemies (Zi 1999:10).
Rulers of countries can make use of triangular relations, such as those during the Three Kingdoms of the Wei, the Shu Han and the Wu (AD 220–80).
Rulers of countries can make use of marriage, benevolence, favour, trade or high-ranking official positions to attract the rulers of neighbouring ethnic groups or split up enemies.
Countries can use armed forces as a deterrent for diplomatic purposes.
In sum, in China’s strategic culture, at the top level, Chinese philosophy is peace loving. In China, there has been no war between religions, and the three major religions—namely, Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism—coexist peacefully. At the middle level, China’s traditional national strategic culture preferred defence over offence. If necessary, however, rulers of countries can launch military attacks to defend territory and people or to realise reunification. At the low level, China’s military strategic culture and foreign strategic culture were realistic. Alastair Lain Johnston’s viewpoint, therefore, that China’s strategic culture was hard Realpolitik was wrong or only partly correct, because his research only touched on China’s military strategic culture and foreign strategic culture during the Ming Dynasty.