Some Americans subscribe to the view of ‘offensive realism’ ^[4] and believe that the interests of the established powers and those of the rising ones will inevitably collide. They believe that the United States is the established power and China a rising one; and, given the current trend of development in China, China presents the most serious potential threat to the United States. Thus writes offensive realist scholar John Mearsheimer (2001), ‘Over time…China could become the most powerful rival the United States has ever faced.’ The sentiment also resonates in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review Report released in September 2001: ‘Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to US interests’ (US Department of Defence 2001:4).

According to this perspective, the relationship between China and the United States is a zero-sum game: what is good for China is bad for the United States and vice versa. Thus, those who hold this view see China’s economic growth as a threat to the United States rather than in terms of improved living conditions for the Chinese people and new opportunities to boost US economic welfare; they regard China’s efforts to improve its relations with its neighbours as China’s attempt to expand its influence at the expense of the United States (Tkacik and Dillon 2005–06); they consider Chinese hopes to improve military-to-military relations with the United States a conspiracy to steal US military secrets rather than an effort to build confidence and trust between the two countries. In other words, they believe the rise of China is not a benign development but a dangerous challenge to US supremacy (<http://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/ TranscriptContainer/China.pdf>). They therefore advocate a policy of containing and restraining China.

Some in China hold similar views about the United States. To them, the United States, as the established power, is not going to allow China to rise, even peacefully. US efforts, such as enhancing its military alliance with Japan, developing military ties with China’s neighbours, especially India, prolonging its military operations in Central Asian states, selling weapons to Taiwan and strengthening its military presence on Guam are various aspects of a grand strategy aimed at containing China. Even US initiatives to promote international cooperation to deal with climate change are viewed as a way to undermine China’s competitiveness. In response, they believe that China should and must be prepared to meet such a challenge militarily (see, for example, <http://yulimin.javaeye.com/blog/27457>).

Such views on both sides reinforce one another and at times generate much suspicion in both countries, which threatens to undermine the basis of their cooperation.

Differences in values and political priorities between the two countries also generate suspicion and hostility. Despite significant changes in values in China in the past decades, as discussed in previous sections, China remains different to the United States in terms of certain values and political priorities. As a socialist country led by a communist party, China’s official ideology is still Marxist, although with Chinese characteristics, according to the Chinese Government. As an Asian country attaching relatively greater weight to communal than to individual interests, China is less willing than the West wishes to protect individual rights and interests. And, as a developing country undergoing rapid economic and social transformations, China gives priority to economic development and political stability over political liberalisation and democratisation.

In the eyes of most Americans, China’s political system is not democratic: there is no multiparty competition, no free and competitive elections, no rule of law, no free press and no free association. Since most Americans subscribe to the theory of democratic peace—that is, democratic countries do not fight each other—they are worried that if China remains undemocratic as it rises, it will pose a threat to the security interests of the United States (Twining 2007). They therefore push their government to put pressure on China to democratise in a way they want to see. This in turn restrains the US Government from taking a more consistent and constructive approach towards China, complicating interactions between the two countries.

Although most Americans do not share the offensive realists’ views on China, they do feel uncertain about the implications of China’s rise. After all, the sheer size of China means that its rise will inevitably bring about substantial changes in the world. No-one can fully foresee what this means in terms of security, economics, energy, the environment and other areas of international concern, let alone people’s job security and lifestyles. Therefore, their feelings of uncertainty are only natural. Uncertainty breeds caution, however, and caution makes it easier for people to subscribe to arguments in terms of worst-case scenarios. If not handled well, this situation could lead to popular support for efforts to hedge against China. Such efforts would in turn lead to Chinese feelings of insecurity and efforts by them to boost their defence, resulting in additional uncertainties on the part of others.