While the NLC’s intervention on 18 August had failed to achieve its immediate objectives, it had directly challenged the primacy of those relationships that had governed conduct of the Coronation Hill issue up to that point, and had served notice that a new player, strategically aggressive and with a much broader mandate to represent Aboriginal interests, was now in the field. Moreover, that field itself was now much larger than Coronation Hill. Prior to the July 1987 elections, the Federal Government had declared Stage III of Kakadu National Park over the area of Gimbat and Goodparla stations, subject to about one third being reserved as a ‘Conservation Zone’ in which mineral exploration would be allowed for 5 years. The Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service began preparations to take over management of the other two thirds of the area. The boundaries of the Conservation Zone were drawn tentatively (Figure 12-2), to be refined later in the year, and the Coronation Hill Joint Venture was one of many mining interests expected to compete for exploration rights over the zone. What was immediately clear, however, was that the southern half of the zone intruded into the region of the Bula Dreaming, and included, or lay very close to, a number of powerful sites.

Having established its prominence with respect to Coronation Hill, the NLC in September moved to engage comprehensively with the new complexities of policy in the region. The first requirement was to consolidate its relationship with the Jawoyn. In his report on the blasting consultations of 18 August, one of the NLC officers had noted ruefully that the BHP project team had succeeded in establishing good personal relations with the important Jawoyn decision makers, and that the NLC had now itself to carefully win their confidence. The first step, he suggested, should be to consult with them again to confirm their instructions and clarify their relationship.

The NLC’s meeting with the Jawoyn Association on 1 September ranged widely over the problems and possibilities facing the Aboriginal claimants of the area. As most of the Conservation Zone was not protected by sacred site registrations, and as Federal policy at that time appeared to be moving strongly towards allowing at least some exploitation of what was known to be a highly prospective mineral province, the NLC’s program had to be broadly concerned with advancing the Jawoyn position within the emerging mix of competing interests. The NLC director pointed out that continued contradictions from the Jawoyn over the Coronation Hill project could ultimately be used against them, and assured them that the NLC would support whatever their final position turned out to be. Following the meeting, the NLC renewed communication with the BHP team to arrange discussions aimed at a mining agreement.

Most importantly, however, the NLC, in concert with the ASSPA and the Australian Conservation Foundation, lobbied the Federal Government to delay any decision on the final boundaries of the Conservation Zone and the allocation of mining tenements until a survey of cultural and natural resources, and the ASSPA’s sacred site documentation program, were completed, and the Aboriginal claimants of the area were properly consulted.^[24] This renewed lobbying effort showed that the NLC and the ASSPA, even at the height of inter-agency tensions over their respective mandates with respect to Coronation Hill, were still able to act in concert to advocate recognition of Aboriginal interests in the Stage III area at senior policy level. Notably, senior opinion in both organisations regarded Aboriginal acceptance of mining at Coronation Hill as a possibility. The NLC at this point acknowledged both the ASSPA’s role in establishing the extent of Aboriginal interests in the Conservation Zone and their joint effort in lobbying the government. However, the request for the government to delay its decision set the stage for a further elevation of the NLC’s strategic position in the region.

Five Federal Ministers met on 24 September in Canberra to discuss Conservation Zone policy. Among them, the Minister for the Environment, Graham Richardson, had had previous exposure to Aboriginal disagreements over Coronation Hill, and the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Gerry Hand, was also aware that Aboriginal opinion had been unsettled. The Ministers decided that final determination of the Conservation Zone boundaries would be delayed until there had been further consultation regarding Aboriginal concerns. In a policy debate that to this point had been dominated by environmentalists and miners, and in which Aboriginal issues had been seen as a secondary complication, a high-level decision now turned on the Aboriginal interest in the area. More significantly for the strategic disposition of the players, the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs charged the NLC with responsibility for determining Aboriginal views and removing confusion over the Jawoyn position.^[25] The NLC thereby became primary advisor to the Federal Government concerning Aboriginal interests in the Conservation Zone. The NLC took this as legitimation of its claim to sole running of the Aboriginal issues in the region. Its senior officers determined that both the Jawoyn and the ASSPA were to be apprised of the NLC’s position as representative of Jawoyn interests in the Kakadu Stage III area, and that the Jawoyn should provide the NLC with relevant instructions.

The NLC’s position on Coronation Hill, however, was affected dramatically a few days later. After some dilatory communications, the NLC and the BHP team agreed to meet on site on 5 November to inspect the project and begin substantive discussions aimed at a mining agreement. A small Jawoyn group were present to observe and later receive advice from the NLC. This meeting marked the high-water mark of the BHP team’s campaign to achieve Aboriginal approval for the project. The following day, 15 members of the newly convened Jawoyn Working Group (established by the NLC to manage Katherine Gorge and Kakadu Stage III issues for the Jawoyn), including two of the senior custodians, met with 10 NLC officers at Barunga and told the NLC that they did not want any mining in the area of influence of the Bula sites, including at Coronation Hill. This declaration sparked significant criticism of the NLC decision to negotiate with BHP, including from within the organisation. The NLC advised BHP that it was withdrawing from the process until the Federal Government had arrived at a final decision concerning mining development in the area.^[26] In other words, the NLC would not now discuss development of the Coronation Hill project unless the government decided that the project would proceed.

As had happened previously, there remained the possibility that the ASSPA might authorise further works. The NLC was therefore explicit in again identifying the Aboriginal constituency to whose interests the government should attend. In his letter to the Minister for the Environment, the NLC director argued that the NLC’s presentation of a collective Jawoyn position should be preferred over any inconsistent statements made by the ASSPA on behalf of the site custodians.^[27] The ASSPA director had long believed that the custodians’ concerns over Coronation Hill did not amount to a total opposition to development, and that the project could be negotiated if carefully presented for approval in incremental stages. By December 1987, however, he perceived a shift in the views of the senior custodians against mining. In February 1988, the ASSPA deferred to the larger processes in train and agreed not to issue any further development approvals to BHP until the NLC–Jawoyn submission to Government was finalised.

Pursuant to its new expanded brief, the NLC set about the task of ascertaining the extent and nature of Jawoyn concerns in the area, and of formulating political submissions to advance those interests. Over the following months, it became convinced that most Jawoyn were absolutely opposed to exploration or mining at Coronation Hill or anywhere else in the Conservation Zone. A consultancy project for the NLC canvassed Jawoyn opinion widely, and not only concluded that most Jawoyn were opposed to mining, but argued that development activities in the Bula region were responsible for major social stresses within the Jawoyn community (Josif 1988). This was the formal Jawoyn position that the NLC passed to the Federal Government, and continued to insist upon as the dispute intensified. Development work at Coronation Hill was able to proceed for another dry season on the basis of existing approvals, but came to an end early in 1989.

1987 thus proved to be a deceptive year for BHP. On the surface of things it appeared to be a period of steady progress at every level. Development approvals had extended to the use of explosives, and by November the BHP team had embarked on the initial stages of negotiating a mining agreement with Aboriginal interests and the company was able to mount strong arguments for favoured treatment for the joint venture in the allocation of exploration rights in the Conservation Zone. At the same time, however, its fortunes were being undermined by the major transformation of that year, in the role of the NLC. From its early position as occasional advisor, the NLC had succeeded, through a combination of enabling legal change and evolving political strategy, in inserting itself as the mining company’s counterpart in negotiations, and had been recognised by the Federal Government as its chief source of policy advice regarding Aboriginal interests in the area. From that position it supported and advanced a case both against mining and in favour of Aboriginal ownership of the Conservation Zone.