No doubt Defence would cry foul at the suggestion that such an approach is in operation today. Indeed, they would point to the very detailed and seemingly scientific approach they have to strategic and capability planning. Nonetheless, I assert that, while the bureaucracy surrounding force development is greater now than at any time since the formation of the Department of Defence by Sir Arthur Tange in the early 1970s, the degree of central strategic control is at a low point.

The conditions are ripe for this to occur. To start with, strategic guidance is more ambiguous and opaque than at any time in at least the preceding 30 years. This leaves more than ample room for arguments to be mustered with far fewer constraints than normal. Then there is the fact that defence planning is no longer constrained by a budget bottom line. It is impossible for reliable central planning to occur in Defence when the government is happy to dole out money directly to the Services—as occurred with ‘hardening and networking’ and the follow-on A$11 billion expansion of the Army initiatives, and similarly with the C-17 Globemaster project.

On the surface, this looks good to those who favour stronger defence, and it is fruitless to argue that more capability is not more capability. Yet it is nonetheless undesirable. To start with, such an approach precludes the considered whole-of-force tradeoffs that are necessary when strategically planning an armed force; we don’t just want more capability, we want the right capability delivered as cost-effectively as possible. Worse still, the present ad hoc approach risks committing future taxpayers to costs that may prove unaffordable. In my estimation, there are already significant unfunded demands built into the budget that the promised 3 per cent growth will not address and, unfortunately, as the above survey of the past showed, once the pace of military operations falls so too will the government’s willingness to fund Defence.

In the longer term the situation will become even more serious, irrespective of the waxing and waning of perceived threat. For the past 30 years ‘the Lucky Country’ has been able to retain both a ‘balanced force’ and a decisive capability edge in the region. This comfortable position will get increasingly harder to sustain as an ageing population erodes our economic growth at the same time as neighbouring economies surge forward. Simply sharing available resources among competing bids by the Services will eventually become a luxury we cannot afford. Hard choices will need to be faced about which military capabilities will deliver the most strategic punch. In fact, given the longevity of military equipment, these are choices we need to be making today.

Three things have to occur before this can happen. First, the Australian Government needs to clarify its strategic guidance, preferably through a new Defence White Paper. Second, Defence has to be given a budget to work within. As long as simply coming back and asking for more is an option, no progress is possible. Third, and most important, discipline and strategic control must be imposed on the capability development process. None of this will be easy to achieve, but it presents the only chance of breaking out of a four-decade cycle of structuring the ADF largely on the basis of replacing what came before.