That is one of the factors eroding the second pillar of the unipolar world—US diplomatic clout—and it is here that the rate of erosion has been most rapid. In late 2001, just after the attacks in New York and Washington, the United States gained the sympathy and the moral or diplomatic support of the entire world, except for a few Islamic societies. Yet less than two years later, by mid 2003, that sympathy had been mostly lost due to the catastrophic strategic error (to my mind) of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. As that episode is discussed more fully below in chapters 3 and 5, I will make little further comment. The relevant point for this study is simply that the viability of an alliance depends in part on the belief among its members that the government of the leading power will make decisions that are wise and prudent, and take account of the interests of the other members. As far as the Bush Administration is concerned, that belief did not survive 2003. Conceivably, the next administration could repair some of the damage. Certainly most of the cabal of neoconservatives in policymaking circles who pushed (even before 2001) for that invasion,^[5] have already been marginalised or exiled from power. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration was re-elected by an increased majority in 2004, despite the gathering US unease over Iraq. One must assume, therefore, that amorphous beliefs exist within the US populace at large that act as an undercurrent of continued support for that kind of adventurism.