Background

The grounded theory method grew in importance and recognition over the years from the seminal work of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967). These two sociologists come from different backgrounds and their collaborative work melds fundamental traditions in sociology (Glaser, 1978; Glaser, 1992; Glaser, 1998; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).

On the one hand, Herbert Blumer, Evert Hughes and Robert Park trained Anselm Strauss in symbolic interaction at the University of Chicago’s school of qualitative research, where Strauss was influenced by the pragmatist philosophical tradition (Charmaz, 2001; Glaser, 1998; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). On the other hand, Barney Glaser was trained in quantitative methodology and qualitative mathematics (a method in which mathematical expressions, such as those of statistical formulas, can be stated qualitatively) at Columbia University by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, an innovator of quantitative methods (Glaser, 1998; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Glaser was also trained in theory construction by Merton; particularly in theoretical coding, which Merton learned from Talcott Parsons and others (Glaser, 1998). Additionally, Glaser received training in explication of text at the University of Paris (Glaser, 1998).

The combination of the distinct backgrounds of Strauss and Glaser, while working together during the early 1960s, produced the constant comparative method later known as grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The founders of grounded theory continued to develop the method over the years independently of each other. Their separated paths led to what now is known as the ‘Straussian’ and ‘Glaserian’ versions of the grounded theory method (Stern, 1994).

Regardless of which specific grounded theory approach guides a particular study, there are important canons to follow for a study claiming the use of grounded theory. Dey (1999), based in Creswell (1998), produced a useful list of grounded theory tenets to introduce some of the basic beliefs behind grounded theory. Reflecting on these tenets, Urquhart (2001) emphasised two key beliefs of grounded theory: (a) the researcher has to set aside theoretical ideas; and, (b) the concepts are developed through constant comparison.

These two beliefs are fundamental building blocks of grounded theory. The first belief tells us that avoiding preconceptions is paramount in doing grounded theory. This point, which seems clear to the grounded theorist, usually puzzles the casual observer. How can a person put aside what she or he knows? The point made in the grounded theory literature is not that a clean slate is necessary or even desirable; the critical point here is that the research does not start with a theory to prove or disprove. With the Grounded Theory Method (GTM), when the researcher holds some deep-rooted beliefs, these can be captured as text and then analysed with other text as just another incident in the data (Glaser, 1978; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The subsequent data analysis, through the constant comparison of incidents, will then falsify, confirm, or extend the applicability of the theory to the substantive area under study.

Furthermore, regardless of the particular approach one might adopt, without the concept of constant comparison grounded theory cannot be developed. Since its first publication in 1965, the constant comparative method has been a key concept in the development and understanding of grounded theory (Glaser, 2001)[3]. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967, pp.113-14), the constant comparative method facilitates the generation of complex ‘theories of process, sequence, and change pertaining to organisations, positions, and social interaction [that] correspond closely to the data since the constant comparison forces the analyst to consider much diversity in the data.’ This diversity is achieved by comparison between incidents and properties of a category, trying to observe as many underlying uniformities and diversities as possible.

The constant comparative method can be used to produce either conceptualisations or rich descriptive accounts. The conceptualisation versus description debate is at the heart of the difference between the Glaserian and Straussian approaches to grounded theory, which is discussed next.

The Glaserian and Straussian approaches

Methods evolve over time and often even their main exponents differ in their interpretation of the best way to evolve. This is indeed the case with grounded theory. The publication of ‘Basics of qualitative research: grounded theory procedures and techniques’ by Strauss and Corbin (1990) and the highly critical public response from Glaser (1992) mark the emergence of an important schism in grounded theory, resulting in the ‘Straussian’ and ‘Glaserian’ models (Stern, 1994).

However, this paper does not aim to arbitrate on what Melia (1996) described as a war of words between friends. Indeed, I perceive both approaches as far more valuable contributions to qualitative researchers than the long epistemological discussions about them. Furthermore, many grounded theory IS researchers have already left this discussion behind and are concentrating on how the method can be improved, taught, and made more relevant to both academe and industry (among others, these include Cathy Urquhart, Hans Lehmann, David Douglas, Stefan Cronholm and Goran Goldkul).

Nonetheless, while accepting the validity of the two approaches, the discrepancies between them are substantial; especially in the use of Strauss and Corbin’s ‘axial coding’ (Glaser, 1992; Kendall, 1999) and the form and nature of the theoretical outcome (Straussian full-description versus Glaserian abstract-conceptualisation). Consequently, researchers must opt for the approach more appropriate for their particular studies. My study followed the Glaserian approach because:

  1. I was more interested in the conceptualisation offered by Glaser than on the full description of Strauss and Corbin. The Glaserian approach has a strong focus on abstract conceptualisations that are not concerned with people and time but tied to the substantive area of inquiry, which made it more useful to my study’s particular goal; relevance to industry. In other words, a method focusing on conceptualisation offered a better probability of contributing to the experts in the substantive field; thus reducing the risk of telling the experts what they already knew.

  2. The Straussian approach appears to be more useful for studies of individuals than studies involving organisational, political, and technical issues (Lehmann, 2001a, p. 9).

  3. The preliminary literature review made me aware of practical problems reported by researchers in using the Straussian coding paradigm (e.g. Cronholm, 2002; Kendall, 1999; Sarker et al., 2000; Sarker et al., 2001; Urquhart, 2001).

  4. The Glaserian approach is far less prescriptive and offers the flexibility of a number of potential coding paradigms, not just one.

In adopting a Glaserian approach I also selected the main methodological texts guiding the investigation. This was important to reduce both controversies and confusion (mine and my audience’s). The main texts were:

  1. ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967),

  2. ‘Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory’ (Glaser, 1978), and

  3. ‘Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions’ (Glaser, 1998).

‘The Grounded Theory Perspective: Conceptualisation Contrasted with Description’ (Glaser, 2001) can also be consulted for a very extensive discussion contrasting the conceptualisation of grounded theory with the need for rich description of other qualitative data analysis methods.