In line with other commentators (notably Hay, 2006; Marquand, 2004), this paper has argued that the central political problem concerns the gap between the formal system and the people whom it purportedly represents. This is a systemic problem, the result of a failure to adapt the formal structure to profound change in its social base. It has been compounded by the primary basis for policy development post-1983: tacit bipartisanship. This top-down process facilitated rapid policy change with minimal attention to public consent. Meanwhile, in their (public) struggle for office, the major parties have adopted populist and opportunist approaches and they have manufactured or suppressed difference. Citizens may not know what is wrong, but they recognise that much of this political drama is a charade. They see that media events dominate political communications. They see that parliamentary rituals and debates are mostly irrelevant. They see that the major party organisations no longer exercise linkage and communication roles. Memberships are tiny. Conferences are wholly stage managed. These outcomes are a consequence of the incentive structure implicit in adversarial politics. Indeed, there is other evidence that Australian’s engagement in politics is undiminished. Citizen energies are now channelled in unconventional activities — for example, the enormous success of the Get-Up organisation and its campaigns, the numbers who have participated in anti-war and pro-reconciliation activity, or the new role of Christian and pro-family organisations.
Yet at first blush, it may seem far fetched to anticipate amendment of the formal structure of politics and policy-making. After all, this architecture is firmly rooted in habits and expectations not just of elites but of the public more generally. Quite properly, the inertial forces are formidable. Change in the formal structure of power is rightly no casual development. As many recent democratic transitions illustrate, such developments are often associated with crisis, turbulence and physical force. Yet with the adoption of MMP New Zealand has recently initiated a peaceful formal change in the structure of power. Through changes in party strength and alignments in Parliament, Australia had a similar experience in 1909. A capacity for peaceful regime adaptation has, since the seventeenth century, made British politics exemplary for others (Beer, 1965). So, although rightly rare, such developments are not unheard of. Further, Australia’s Constitution allows such possibilities. The structure of executive power is not constitutionally determined as for example in the case of the United States. It is rather based on three conventions — ministerial responsibility, confidence and collective cabinet responsibility. These conventions are determined by vote on the floor of Parliament, not by constitutional fiat.
Short of a referendum on the voting system (as occurred in New Zealand), there would seem to be at least two broad paths to structural amendment. One would involve a bottom up movement against the established parties. The other might involve executive action. An executive might recognise that its electoral vulnerability ultimately merits an effort to engage the community more effectively in policy development processes. These possibilities are reviewed in turn.
If minor party support grew sufficiently, the minor parties could take the initiative in proposing change. There are many ways in which they could negotiate with the government or the Opposition. Perhaps above all, they could trade a preference deal for the support of a major party in House of Representatives elections for a real change in the committee structure in the Senate. As I have argued elsewhere, the capacity of minor parties to show their supporters that they are not clones of the government that they are sustaining is critical (1990). Yet backdoor negotiations with the executive run this risk. My earlier study concerned the fate of the Liberals in the UK after the Steel-Callaghan pact was established in the 1970s. The Liberal leader, David Steel, was unable to convince his followers outside Parliament that he had advanced party interests whilst also sustaining the government. In Australia, the Democrats succumbed to analogous problems in their approach to the GST. The Australian Greens face the same difficulty if they become a balance of power party. Yet the experience of the Democrats is also salutary. They were only able to wield a balance of power when supported by one or other of the major parties. Stanley Bach has shown the extent to which in practice the two major parties vote together in the Senate, thus undercutting the influence of minor parties (2003). Adversarial rituals prevail in the House. Shared major party self-interest has mostly prevailed in the Senate.
In any case, to negotiate a deal with a major party as significant as that envisaged here, a minor party would need t be able to demonstrate control of a tranche of votes far beyond that which the Democrats mustered in the past or the Greens do now. Finally, given the parlous state of the Liberal Party, a split along Free Trade and Protectionist lines cannot be ruled out. Electoral incentives are a powerful inertial force. But before its reconstitution by Sir Robert Menzies, splits were a regular feature. At this stage such a scenario is wholly speculative but perhaps also not to be wholly discounted.
At first blush it may seem unlikely that any executive would freely encourage the development of a new transparent phase in the policy-making process. After all this would be based on structures over which, at best, it would only have indirect influence. Yet the case studies of policy-making by the Howard Government pointed to the serious gaps in present arrangements, gaps which severely constrain the governments’ political strategy, indeed bias it towards wedge, opportunist and populist tactics.
There are two reasons to believe structural change may not be wholly unacceptable to an enlightened/ambitious executive. One involves looking backward to the experience of the Howard governments. The other involves looking forward to the emerging policy agenda. Both major parties broadly agreed with the deregulatory and liberalising agenda introduced by Labor in 1983 and continued by the Howard governments from 1996. This micro-economic and deregulatory agenda has now just about run its course. It involved actions by government that liberalised market structures. Assessments were required at the level of the whole economy. Discriminatory or sectoral policies were disfavoured as was the engagement of affected interests. Indeed as public choice theory demonstrated, engagement of affected interests would more likely have corrupted the policy process. Thus the past received wisdom has been to discredit interest groups as selfish and self-serving and distance them as much as possible from policy-making processes.
Emerging policy issues are wholly different in character. Let us take just three: innovation and the knowledge economy; the environment and climate change; and public services such as health, education, hospitals and welfare. In relation to innovation, whilst unfettered markets are absolutely necessary in promoting this outcome, they are not sufficient. The knowledge system that surrounds any particular sector or region is no less important than the market structure in driving continuous improvement. This is the essential conclusion of innovation theory (e.g. West, 2006; Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar, 2005). This introduces considerations quite other than those pertinent to the deregulating and liberalising agenda that has dominated in the past two decades. Now capacities to mobilise interests and to engage them at sectoral levels become much more critical. Capacities for analysis at sectional and regional levels are also required. In passing, we might note that a strategy based around innovation and the knowledge economy would, if fully developed, be tantamount to the renewal (in another key) of Deakin’s protectionist-arbitration strategy. This is because it would unite the most basic social and economic strategies. Access to life long learning would require new educational arrangements matched by support over periods of reskilling. General social security arrangements would need to be consistent with these developments. Meanwhile, federal and state economic strategies would be designed to encourage innovation and continuous improvement at sectoral and regional levels and to aid global engagement. A similar unification was the keystone of the ‘Australian settlement’ and the crowning achievement of social liberalism. In passing, we might also note that the argument developed in this paper in effect applies innovation theory to the national policy system. This foundational knowledge infrastructure also needs to be mapped and developed.
Climate change introduces an even greater imperative for interest and community mobilisation. If the scientific prognosis is only half right, the politics of adaptation promises to be fraught. The need to build deep understanding of implications and options is surely clear. It is equally clear that this process has barely begun. What infrastructure will underwrite these processes? We have clear evidence of deficient capacity in present arrangements. What else is possible? Finally, in relation to health and community services, federal-state relations are primarily involved. But even here, the COAG structure mobilises affected elites. Even in a developed form, it is unlikely to provide sustained access to broader public opinion or affected interests.
A strengthened parliamentary committee system is not of course a panacea for all issues of policy-making. A host of specialist and sectoral research, enquiry and mobilisation mechanisms will doubtless be required. These can augment the technical and mobilising capacities of the policy-making system. But none can match the parliamentary theatre in terms of formal standing and ability to engage interest groups, media and public attention. In an augmented architecture of policy-making, a reconfigured parliamentary committee system, focussed on the Senate, and drawing on the latent powers of that Chamber, offers the best capstone. Such a structure would introduce a contemplative phase to policy development. To avoid the fate of the Howard Government, moves down this path are clearly in the interest of an ambitious executive. Will it be willing to learn from the experience of its predecessors? Will it be sufficiently prudent to recognise its best interests?